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Abstract
At stake in this study is the patient’s credibility. The Cartesian philosophical standpoint, which holds sway in western
thinking, questions with scepticism whether the reported symptoms are ‘‘real.’’ Do they reside in the body, or are they
mentally concocted. However, from the caring perspective any symptom must be both listened and attended to in its own
right, not just scrutinized as evidence for an accurate diagnosis.
In cognitively and emotionally complex high-tech units caregivers are juggling a precarious handful of cards. Technical
tasks take precedence or have more urgency than caring behaviour. Assuming an irremediable tension between object 
subject and care cure in nursing is futile dualism. By addressing the essence of technology*the non-neutral and highly
visual technology*this paper aims to find, from a philosophical point of view, a more comprehensive understanding for the
dominance visualism and technification within intensive care.
Screens give us access to vital signs. Screens record numbers and lines that relate to a graph and afford superfine spiked
‘‘readings.’’ However, the most relevant vital signs may be missing.
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Introduction
For two-and-a-half millennia, technology has accom-
panied Western civilization like a shadow. Nowadays,
tremendous developments have multiplied its impact
upon society at large. This is the age of planetary
technology, of cyberspace and information technol-
ogy. If we wanted to deny that fact, we would have
to use a computer, email, SMS messages, or the FAX
machine to communicate our contestation. At this
point in history, therefore, its impact is impossible to
refute.
From the perspective of rationalistic-dualist
Cartesian thought, symptoms result from the mind
receiving and interpreting bodily impressions and
sensations. Physicians may thus view symptoms as
subjective interpretations of the body’s real disease.
The mind is considered less reliable when it comes
to reporting symptoms than those that can be
documented objectively with medical instrumenta-
tion and measurement (Benner, 2001).
The Cartesian ideology, that splits mind/body,
subject/object, etc., calls into question the credibility
of the patient’s report of her symptoms. Simply put,
Cartesian thought doubts that the symptoms as
reported are real, but suspect that they are mentally
concocted rather than bodily based. However, from
the caring perspective any symptom must be both
heard and attended to in its own right. Not just as
evidence for an accurate diagnosis.
Modern medicine focuses on pathological pro-
cesses. Organ failure and abnormalities tend to take
up the health care providers’ attention at the price of
understanding the patient’s reactions to her/his
illness. Before the development of highly technolo-
gical diagnostic equipment, the physician’s diagnosis
depended upon the patients’ stories (Johannisson,
2004). There has been a transformation; a shift to
vision and its reduction to a certain kind of vision
(Ihde, 2002). Medical technologies used to be more
auditory that visual (Sandelowski, 2000). The visual
has become the ‘‘truth’’ and it exceeds the value of
the audible, for example, what a monitor shows is
more ‘‘true’’ than the patients story (Almerud,
2008). Knowledge ripened during years of clinical
practice, such as ‘‘seeing’’ from the color of his skin
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now takes back seat to objective measures and
parameters that can be viewed from a monitor or a
medical chart. But the objective information that
technological devices grant is only valuable when
interpreted with understanding by a professional
aware of and sensitive to lived human experience
(Walters, 1995). Advances in technology permit a
much more penetrating, in-depth gaze of the physi-
cal body. The gaze transforms the body. Caregivers
tend to see only an outline or small part of the
person rather than the whole individual (Barnard
& Sinclair, 2006). Screens access vital signs and
technology depicts the body by measuring it. Is not
balance required? Both patients and caregivers take
the effectiveness of technology for granted and to
that degree exhibit a deficit of awareness. In a
highly technicized ward, such as an intensive care
unit (ICU), all eyes, even of the family members, are
focused on the machinery, not on the patient
(Almerud, Alapack, Fridlund, & Ekeberg, 2007a).
Practitioners step away from the people (bodies) to
make judgements about ongoing care. It may be
common practice to stand at distance in order to
interpret and assess the progress of care. Conse-
quently the potential for compassionate understand-
ing dwindles. The opportunity to get to know the
person’s subjectivity fades away and the subsequent
distancing smoothes over individual uniqueness and
subjective experience (Almerud, 2008; Barnard &
Sinclair, 2006). Graphs and technical devices display
the body in a series of pictures to observe. The
spectator retreats from the body in order to know
it, not as a whole, but as a compound of displayed
segments (Barnard & Sinclair, 2006). Focusing
upon a purely visual environment gives the impres-
sion of control and objectification, but multi-sensory
dimensions remain constant even if the practitioner
is not attuned to them. Observing a cardiac monitor
puts the spectator’s focus on an isolated body part,
enhancing the experience of visual pre-eminence. If
these solely observing actions lead the practitioner to
return to the person to ask how they feel, they have
made a purposeful choice to focus on the person
through other senses. If the caregiver does not
return, (s)he has then made a choice to take a
distance from the patient and to reject alternative
senses. But that action merely creates the illusion of
control while in fact it risks losing it (Barnard &
Sinclair, 2006). If we perpetuate this way of knowing
that gives primacy to objective and detached know-
ledge, nursing epistemology will contribute to an
impersonal health care system in much the same way
as the biomedical model has (Walters, 1995). In the
technological milieu, the deeply subjective issues
about illness lack a place. It is not because caregivers
in the technological milieu purposely ice out sub-
jective issues or existential dimensions. Modern
technology has a definite place in nursing practice,
but as a supplement to and not a substitute for
the art of healing (Mitchell, 2007). The naturally
shallow technological routines consume time and
control too much of the caregiver’s time and atten-
tion. In consequence, (s)he overlooks the patient as a
unique person and fails to notice idiosyncratic
worries (Almerud, 2008). The caregiver overlooks
the lived body’s experiences because they defy
technological monitoring (Walters, 1995). Techno-
logy, however, is not necessarily opposed to huma-
nized care (Barnard & Sandelowski, 2001).
Human choices; human acumen or human
error
In high-tech units, cognitively and emotionally
complex environments, caregivers juggle a precar-
ious handful of cards. Despite being constantly
monitored and observed, patients feel invisible.
The patient and the apparatus easily meld into a
unit, one item to be regulated and read. From the
patients’ perspective, caregivers demonstrate keen
vigilance over technological devices and measured
parameters, but pay scant attention to their stories
and experiences. Technical tasks take precedence or
have more urgency than caring behaviour (Almerud
et al., 2007a). Technology has usurped the human
touch and the bedside manner of the physician and
nurse.
The aim of care is not immediately to ‘‘fix’’ the
person who is out of balance*out of equilibrium*
but to focus and to see treatment on the whole
person, seeing illness as a lifeworld disturbance as
well as a biological disturbance (Gadamer, 1996).
Assuming an irremediable tension between object 
subject and care cure in nursing is futile dualism.
The challenge is to understand the meaning of
technology and its relationship to suffering humans,
i.e., patients (Almerud, 2008). Heidegger (1954/
1993) tells us that thinking must precede and
ground doing. How we think takes priority over
what we do. He also reminds us that the uncanny
thing about thinking is that we have not yet begun to
think. Heidegger’s thinking and the awareness he
advances sets us walking on the razor’s edge.
However, strong the lure of the paraphernalia, it is
human choice, or default of choosing, that adopts
the attitude. Is it possible to understand reflectively
the dominant paradigm of our age? If we can indeed
comprehend it, how do we authentically asses it?
There are situational conflicts that emerge when a
nurse or physician faces a crisis. What calls the
shots? Is it monitoring device or human intuition
S. Almerud-O ¨ sterberg
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contribution to start thinking in a relevant direction
by examining the presence of technology in high-
tech wards with the focus on seeing. The aim of this
study is to find, from a philosophical point of view,
a more comprehensive understanding for the
dominance of visualism and technification within
intensive care.
Technology and tools in practice
Technology is a featured actor in many hospital
settings, but in the ICU in particular. In a hospital
setting humans tend to interpret themselves in terms
of technology by claiming that a rhythm strip
observed on a cardiac monitor is my heart and that
urine in a catheter bag is my urine (Barnard
& Sinclair, 2006). The gadgetry is ambiguously
both a support and a burden (Almerud, Alapack,
Fridlund, & Ekeberg, 2007b). Nurses and physi-
cians, no matter how impressive our technological
equipment becomes, must never be reduced to
technicians. ‘‘Good’’ technology provides informa-
tion, gives parameters and saves lives. The human
alone can utilize the data properly to prohibit human
harm; the human alone can garner the promises of
new possibilities for a richer existence (Almerud
et al., 2007b). Communication ‘‘through’’ technol-
ogy is so complex that keeping in perspective what or
who is the focus for ‘‘seeing’’ or caring is a difficult
challenge (Almerud et al., 2007b). Tools do nothing
by themselves; they perform the work done by
different staff members and regulate infusions and
drug injections. Like the injection pump, the drip
counter andthe ventilatorarethe resources for skilled
personnel. Tools are nothing but tools. Medicine and
machines are minor tools, as soon as one recognizes
that the major tool is the tool-user; the caregiver who
speaks and listens, who draws near and touches, but
who also sees from afar and acts with appropriate
distance. It is a subtle dialectic of closeness-distance
(Almerud, 2008). Technologies transform human
experience, but they cannot replace them.
The essence of technology
We can mine positive possibilities out of all the
technologies available to us. Heidegger’s perspective
on technology, although far removed from the
mundane matters of nursing, provides the lifeline
for the joining technology and nursing care into their
inherent fittingness (Heidegger, 1954/1993, 1962).
The essence of technology, Gestell, is not technolo-
gical. Gestell is the striving after efficiency for
efficiency’s sake. It pursues efficiency not only for
the sake of the products it will bring forth, the
money it will generate, but also for the power it will
garner. The attitude of technology seeks efficiency to
be ceaselessly efficient (Heidegger, 1977). So easily
it spins out of control and proliferates, that it blurs
the radiance of all other ways of coming-to-presence
and swallowing other values (Heidegger, 1954/
1993).
The ‘‘danger’’ is this. Under the domination of
Gestell, all beings whatsoever are disclosed as stock
or resource; objective, calculable, quantifiable, prof-
itable, or disposable. The self-emerging natural
things, such as water, coal, and oil are used as
resources for industrial, mechanical, and technical
operations. Words written by the poet or thinker are
subject to the calculations of the publishing industry
before they find their way into print. The values of
profit and of efficiency for efficiency’s sake sabotage
what by vocation we should shelter and safeguard,
viz., our own being and Being (Heidegger, 1954/
1993). The power and beauty of Heidegger’sa n a -
lyses is that they fit both the broad geopolitical
situation and the local clinical milieu. Lucid thinking
about Gestell must not be satisfied to ‘‘affirm or
deny’’ technology, or to ‘‘merely represent and
pursue’’ it, ‘‘put up with or evade it’’ or*worst of
all*regard it as something neutral (Heidegger,
1954/1993, pp. 311 312). Human decision control
and eliminate the Green House gases, just as a
nurse reads the calibrations of a ventilator. The
technological attitude blurs Being’s radiance, ren-
ders it empty and tawdry. But the drive for mastery
and profit is a human not technological decision
(Heidegger, 1954/1993).
The non-neutral technology
Ihde (1990) addresses the diversity and complexity
of human technology relationships in our era. He
reiterates the point that technology is not neutral.
The literal relationship between the humans and
the world should be conceived as a symbiotic
and mediated relationship instead of as a divided
and instrumental one (Ihde, 1990). According to
Merleau-Ponty (1962/2002), there are many ways
for consciousness to be conscious and for the body
to be body. Ihde (1993) also says, there are many
ways for technology to be a technology. No technical
object is restricted to what designers intended it for
or conceived the outcome of its use. It is the context
that co-constitutes the use of a technical implement
(Ihde, 1993). Heidegger (1962) hands us the
hammer. In its use, it becomes the means and not
the object of the experience. There is no ‘‘user’’
somehow apart from the ‘‘tool.’’ The two are
ineluctably joined. The ‘‘menu’’ here is not one
substance, the hammer, and a second substance,
The patient behind the screen
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tionally. It is not an ‘‘in itself,’’ but its meaning is an
implement. As the ‘‘for which’’ it is oriented, at
minimum, to the nails and to the man’s arm. One
knows the hammer by hammering (Heidegger,
1962).
Relationships with the technology both enhance
and transform our perceptual-bodily experience of
the environment or the world (Ihde, 1990). Ihde’s
(2002) insistence on non-neutrality is important.
Barnard (1997) critiques nursing literature and
identifies a failure to confront the belief that the
technology is a neutral object. For many nurses
technology may not be a neutral servant of her or
his act of will, but a pervasive reality which modifies
practice, politics, values, and environments. Tech-
nology is given its own ‘‘life’’ (Almerud et al.,
2007a), it becomes anthropomorphized. Whatever
‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’ outcome technology generates, it
is never neutral (Almerud et al., 2007a). What is
neutral in terms of being a patient in ICU? Nothing!
Next of kin and patients feel safer in a technological
intense environment*not neutral. Work in wards
handling advanced technological apparatuses is high
status and prestigious*not neutral. Put in positive
terms, some value is at stake and is calling the shots.
In a ‘‘dehumanized’’ field, nonetheless, still there is a
need for humanity. We make the machine human
and predicate human characteristics to it. If technol-
ogy was just neutral, why make it human? Machine
contact, however, can be regarded as neutral in the
sense that there is nothing reciprocal about it. For
the sick person, interactions with the machine evoke
only frustration, intimidation, or the strangeness
and awkwardness of finding oneself plugged in
(Almerud, Alapack, Fridlund, & Ekeberg, 2008).
The visual technology
Caretakers in the ICU interpret the physical body
in different ways. It becomes measurable and, to
some extent, predictable, and controllable. The
technology of the ICU gives primacy to information
displayed in graphical or numerical forms. When
we are a patient, our objective body*the body that
we have*is cable-connected to apparatuses, such as
a monitoring device. Caretakers demonstrate keen
vigilance over technological devices, documented
data, laboratory results, and measured parameters
(Almerud et el., 2007b). The twist concerning
vigilance and invisibility creates an alienating colli-
sion. Instruments confirm treatment status and
progress (Almerud et al., 2007b; Barnard & Sinclair,
2006; Benner, 2001). Monitoring closely the early
critical periods is vital. Careful observation does
indeed promote a feeling of security (Almerud et al.,
2007a). However, transforming patients into
ciphers, albeit unwittingly, is contra-therapeutic.
Visualism
Ihde (2002) calls visualism the cultural habit of
science to produce, display, and reiterate what
counts for evidence in visual form. The various
information-gathering devices are increasingly devel-
oped to make visual displays. This cultural habit has
been accelerated in late modernity through the
sophisticated development of imaging technologies
(Ihde, 2002). I see*through the optical artifact*
the world. Technologies are thus in between the
seer and the world. These new perceptual insights
enhance our bodily experiences of being in the world
(Ihde, 1993). Early modern visualism was also
technologized. The camera obscura reduced three-
dimensional images to two-dimensional images.
Photography, like the camera obscura, easily re-
duced the object to an isomorphic and realistic fixed
image on the photographic plate, completely without
subjectivity (Ihde, 2002). Nevertheless, constant
clinical surveillance boomerangs. It oppresses when-
ever seemingly medical needs of examinations,
treatment, or exercise ride rough-shod over human
concerns. Patients feel constantly monitored and
observed, not seen (Almerud et al., 2007a; Barnard
& Sinclair, 2006). Checking the screen to make sure
the top line does not go flat is indeed the bottom line
in a situation of critical or life-threatening illness, but
serious monitoring does not have to obscure the
nurse’s sensitivity to see the suffering human. Like-
wise, physicians can get ‘‘stuck’’ in handling tech-
nological devices by routine, solely manipulating
buttons and technological adjustments such that
they end up treating ‘‘bad’’ laboratory test results,
not sick patients (Almerud et al., 2007a; Barnard &
Sinclair, 2006).
It is that strange identification again. On super-
ficial, one-dimensional levels, the patients ‘‘know’’
they are seen insofar as ‘‘their’’ apparatus is read
continually and regulated religiously. Their visibility
is a function of the chords and cables that connect
them to the machine. But at personal levels of depth
and height, they feel invisible. To them, for the most
part, it is evident that the faith that the caregivers
demonstrate in apparatuses is not matched by
comparable reflection upon their dominant presence
or by any discussion with them of its human impact
(Almerud et al., 2007a). ‘‘The desire is to see, but
seeing is seeing through instrumentation’’ (Ihde,
1990, pp. 75 76). The caregiver sees the patient
through the monitor. Visualization is the Western
way. Whether looking at the patient in bed or a
monitor, caregivers interpret and understand the
S. Almerud-O ¨ sterberg
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ultimate criterion of empiricism. Thus, professional
nurses of today encounter technology as a virtual
reality in increasingly interpretive relations in front
of screens seeking image-based realities to evaluate
the health disease dimension (Barnard & Sinclair,
2006). Technology mediates the seer and the seen
situation (Ihde, 1993). But seeing goes beyond
visualism: ‘‘it is only with the heart that one can
see rightly; what is essential is invisible to the eye’’
(de Saint-Exupe ´ry, 1943/1995).
Final reflections
How do we perceive what we look at? In the West,
we have become so used to computers and TV and
one-way virtual realities*accustomed to adjudging
what comes at us via our eyes is not just neutral, but
also the truth, the ‘‘visual truth.’’ Wrapped into this
bias is ‘‘calculomania.’’ What cannot be measured
has lower status. What cannot be monitored does
not count. Within the politics of the hospital, it is not
the caring for critically ill or injured persons that
creates the high status, but rather skilful use of
the technological equipment. The monitor is the
‘‘finish line’’ which provides us with the ‘‘truth.’’
Merleau-Ponty (1962/2002) writes that ‘‘decision
precedes motive.’’ In what almost amount to a
rationalization, nurses express the conviction that
their professional duties, per se, bring them con-
stantly close to their patients. But it is the ‘‘techni-
cal’’ closeness of washing, cleaning, and turning the
patient. They decide that having bedside computers
even increases closeness to the patients (Almerud
et al., 2007b). But what is closeness? Distancing
from the person in bed, gives the caregivers a
spectator’s vision. They are with the person, yet
strangely distant because they lost the intimacy and
connectedness that can be obtained by close physical
and emotional proximity (Barnard & Sinclair, 2006).
From Merleau-Ponty’s (1962/2002) standpoint,
we as flesh are seen-seers, heard-hearers, touched
because we also touch. Dualisms are thus cancelled
out. In the matter of clinical observation, seeing
must not stop at the monitor. The caregiver must
look behind the numbers on the screen to see the
person. We can look at the patient with double
vision, not look as if a Cyclops. Authentic ‘‘objectiv-
ity’’ presence is given equally to the monitor and to
the naked eye.
There are times a nurse concentrates on the
objective measurements displayed on the monitoring
equipment to the detriment of humanistic caring.
But in a life-threatening emergency, s(he) needs
technology to provide objective information about
physiological processes. It is lifesaving (Walters,
1995). The nurse can use a gadget in such a way
to either bring her closer or drive her away from
her patient (Barnard, 2006). From a Heideggerian
standpoint, claiming that any technical device is
inherently good or evil would lead nowhere. Touch,
the basis for care, makes it impossible to separate
technology from caring. Seeing is touching and
touching is seeing. Technology is co-creating the
way we interpret ourselves and conceptually depict
the world. It effects and affects the views that human
users of technology have of themselves and the
world. How many times would you expect to read
in a hospital’s charting book or in a medical report
the phrases she was ‘‘heart-sick’’ after her mother’s
death or she died of a broken heart? Screens give us
access to vital signs, we believe. Maybe we need to
change focus and terminology. Screens record num-
bers and lines that relate to a graph. The vital signs,
the real vitals signs, may be missing even though the
spiked ‘‘reading’’ is superfine.
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